Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Limits of Contingency'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
2666 Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
20768 Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
21390 Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades]
21672 We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
18851 Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15825 Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
21389 Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
21671 Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
21391 Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
21674 Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
7398 Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
3049 The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3549 Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
21392 People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
18854 The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]